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Abstract 
 
Why had counterterrorism policy in Mali failed by 2012? This chapter addresses this 
question from the perspective of how US diplomacy’s assessment of issues, subjects and 
threats on the ground, and how this informed Sahel counterterrorism policy. Analysis of 
diplomatic communication 2006-10 demonstrates that despite considerable expertise by 
Bamako-based US diplomats, their considerably nuanced and detailed assessments and 
recommendations were ultimately ignored or deemed irrelevant. 
 
Failure to utilise available diplomatic information and analysis was due to the dominant 
policy prioritisation of counterterrorism by military securitisation of territory and 
borders. The diplomatic communications show that this prioritisation granted the Malian 
government considerable influence in determining US counterterrorism policy in the 
country. As a result, the grievances of Mali's northern peoples were exacerbated, and 
extremism thrived -a tragedy considering US diplomats knew what to do. 
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Before deploying counterterrorism initiatives, it is necessary to identify terrorists, their 
enablers and associates. During the War on Terror, US diplomats in West Africa were 
repeatedly tasked with an identification and information mission – to identify terrorist 
political subjects including terrorists, their networks, financing and other enabling 
factors, as well as subjects susceptible to radicalisation. This chapter explores how they 
did this through analysis of their diplomatic communication and reporting, and the 
extent to which their information, analysis and advice was not taken into account in the 
articulation of specific applications of counterterrorism in Mali. The argument is made 
that prioritising military securitisation of territory and borders as counterterrorism 
strategy enabled Malian diplomatic interventions to refocus counterterrorism efforts 
towards sustaining the Malian state, aggravating dissent in the north of Mali and further 
alienating Tuareg and Moor constituencies. It is observed that this was due to the 
application of dominant policy concerns and priorities to how information from 
diplomats on the ground was assessed. As a result information not directly related to 
dominant policy concerns was deemed irrelevant and secondary, while communications 
that were related gained importance, granting greater policymaking agency to the actors 
and information that bear it.  
 
In January 2012, northern Mali was overrun by a Tuareg and Islamist coalition 
comprising Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Malian Salafist group Ansar Dine, 
AQIM-aligned Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), 
and Tuareg rebel alliance Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale d’Anzawad (MLNA). 
In June 2012, however, the Islamist elements of the coalition expelled their Tuareg allies 
from all the taken cities in Mali’s three northern provinces of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. 
In a December 2012 speech at the US Senate, Senate Foreign Relations Africa 
subcommittee member Senator Chris Coons highlighted the need for a political, as well 
as military, solution to the crisis (“Floor Speech,” 2012). In this and other speeches, 
Coons specifically pointed to unresolved Tuareg grievances that had, in effect, to be 
considered separately from the Islamist uprising (“Senate African Affairs Subcommittee 
hearing on Mali,” 2012). 
 
These events are the result of a worrying trend. David Gutelius argued in 2006 that US 
counterterrorism policies problematically focused on state actors. In the case of Mali, 
support for the Malian state enabled it not to resolve longstanding grievances of Tuareg 
and Moor minorities in the north (Gutelius, 2006). Gutelius predicted that, beyond 
causing long-term instability in Mali, US focus on the Malian state would radicalise 
elements that would and could read counterterrorism efforts as a challenge to their 
domestic claims (Gutelius, 2007). This prediction seems validated by events in 2012, 
raising the question as to why social counterterrorism policy, the political cause of 
counterterrorism so to speak, had become so incomplete and unable to put into practice 
social counter-radicalisation.  
 
Following recent qualitative research Gow, Olonisakin and Dijxhoorn conclude that the 
northern Mali conflict was more likely fuelled by a combination of a youth demographic 
crisis and the socio-economic concerns of a disenfranchised Tuareg ethnic population 
'not necessarily, and initially, driven by homegrown fundamentalists' (2013, pp. 244–8). 
In the application of counterterrorism policies in the Sahel region, it has been observed 
that a broad, social and long-term approach was essential (Cline, 2007). It is clear, 
however, that especially when the northern Mali crisis broke out in 2012 engagement 
with MNLA was, until Sen. Coon’s intervention, subsumed into the assumption of 
Islamic political subjectivity. That is, Tuareg rebels were swept into the identification of 
terrorism as represented by AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine. If indeed it 'remains 
unclear how far radical Islamism is really at the heart of the goals of Ansar Dine' 
(Dijxhoorn & N’Diaye, 2013, p. 226), it emerges that identification of certain actors such 
as Tuareg rebels was problematic, for it was contextually scarce, unhistorical, uninformed 
and ultimately detrimental to counter-radicalisation efforts (James Gow, Olonisakin, & 
Dijxhoorn, 2013). This problem extends not only to identification of the Tuareg, but 
more broadly to academic and policy-making understanding of the identification of 
radical Islamic subjects.  
 
This chapter takes this issue to the field of diplomatic practice, asking the question of 
how and whether US counterterrorism policy in Mali was informed by diplomats on the 
ground. Communication from diplomats in-country back to the State department should 
play a key role in informing policymakers as to political conditions on the ground. 
Diplomats develop significant expertise and contact networks, providing invaluable 
contextual information as to subjects, groups and political developments on the ground 
for policy-making. This analysis interrogates the relevant State Department cables leaked 
in 2011 by Wikileaks to analyse how diplomatic communication participated – or not – in 
the identification of issues and subjects of terrorism in Mali. Crucially, it further provides 
the opportunity to investigate how the political cause of counterterrorism in Mali had 
become focused exclusively on shoring up the Malian state.  
 
 
Reading identity in diplomatic communication 
 
Name-calling has a role to play in diplomacy. The method of the analysis here offered 
draws on the Poststructuralist philosophical position that the constitution of any political 
identity is not independent of the texts and enunciations that articulate them (see 
Nietzsche, 1997; Nietzsche, 1914; Connolly, 2002, 1984; Shapiro, 1989, 1988). Language 
thus does not only describe, but in fact participates in the constitution of representation. 
This theoretical approach looks to the texts where political identities are articulated to 
retrieve how a subject is inscribed (ideationally located, that is) in an intersubjective 
context. By analytically treating text as literary production, discourse analysis can retrieve 
how subjects are located by a specific communication in spatial, temporal and normative 
dimensions, revealing the subjectivity of the inscription. Post-structuralists have in this 
way explored successfully how constructions of identity constitute understanding of 
conflict, subjects and spaces (see for instance Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006).  
 
The form of this method I have developed, the diplomatic text, conceptualises the practice 
of diplomacy through its claim to represent the state at those instances when an agent 
speaks on behalf of the sovereign international actor. This data selection rationale means 
considering the communications of agents besides professional diplomats such as 
leaders, parliamentarians like Sen. Chris Coons, military officers and others who on select 
instances speak on behalf of an international actor (see Constantinou, 1996). The data 
used in this analysis is US diplomatic communication between the US embassy in 
Bamako and the State Department between 2006 and 2010 (leaked via Wikileaks in 
2010). Cables and other documents of diplomatic relevance, as per the above selection 
rationale, total 413. Cables are cited by their original State Department reference, where 
the first two numbers indicate the year, the letters provenance and the last number its 
location in cables register.  
 
In diplomacy, communication is drafted, sent, redrafted, summarised and its relevance 
assessed before being sent on to eventually reach the desks of policymakers. This is a 
process of identifying political subjects. It should be added that dominant policy concerns 
such as terrorism, and priorities such as counterterrorism, influence the reading, 
relevance and categorisation of political subjects. To account for this intersubjectivity 
and plurality of textual sites, this methodology looks to intertextual approaches which 
consider text in the context of preceding diplomatic messages and, crucially, in parallel to 
the text of dominant policy concerns – statements prioritising policies that is. This 
analysis furthermore examines the ‘history of the present’ (Foucault, 1984). It traces the 
development of the inscription of identity that determined policy to investigate its 
constitution. Accounting for changes in political identity referents in respect to their own 
development indicates the potential productivity of identity readings and their location in 
the global economy of threats and subjects.  
 
Post-structuralist analysis of identity deconstructs the constitution of identity, 
demonstrating its contingent and constructed nature. The methodology of the diplomatic 
text additionally retrieves how, by whom and at which precise instances agency is invested 
in a particular reading of identity. In many ways, it represents an effort to address the old 
IR question of how policymakers are informed by querying how the text of that advice 
constitutes political identities (for more detail on the methodology and its application 
see: de Orellana, 2015). Such is the importance of knowing who We and the Other are.  
 
This chapter firstly analyses the expertise and range of information US diplomats had 
developed in Mali, locating key issues and recommendations issued by those diplomats. 
Secondly, the text and spirit of dominant US policy concerns and priorities in Mali are 
considered. Thirdly, this chapter explores how Malian government engagement with 
these concerns enabled them to supplant recommendations by US diplomats, granting 
President Touré’s government significant agency in determining the application of US 
counterterrorism policy in Mali, particularly in the identification of pertinent subjects and 
issues.  
 
 
US diplomatic expertise in Mali 
 
Cables show that US diplomats in Bamako developed an impressive network of contacts 
and expertise on crucial issues of Malian politics, particularly the conflict with Tuareg and 
Arabs. Their expertise developed from regional political knowledge, meetings with key 
figures, travel and even canvassing fish vendors in Bamako on one instance 
(06BAMAKO1415). This section analyses the terms and extent of diplomatic advice on 
key subjects, issues and grievances of the conflict in northern Mali. These include: 
Tuareg and Arab ethnic and tribal groups in northern Mali, the main areas of conflict in 
Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu provinces, religious groups and political affiliation, criminal 
enterprise (mainly trafficking, kidnapping and drugs) and relationship to Islamic 
terrorism and AQIM. Additionally, diplomats considered the nature and chief actors of 
the northern conflict, particularly since the 2006 rebellion bid by Tuareg groups, which 
they recognised had implications for counterterrorism efforts in Mali. 
 
The ethnic, tribal, cultural and religious map of Mali built by American diplomats in-
country was thorough. It was elaborated from local news, observation, visits to various 
locations around the country, and interviews of contacts across the Malian political 
spectrum, which were regularly assessed in terms of validity and accuracy. Contacts 
notably included senior leaders of the rebel Tuareg Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai 
pour le Changement (ADC) (See 07BAMAKO1006, 09BAMAKO211). Reports show 
that embassy officers were aware of differences among Tuareg groups, tribes and 
alliances (08BAMAKO0371, 08BAMAKO239), and collected biographical information 
on power-holders in the three northern provinces, gauging their influence in terms of 
institutions, caste and tribe and even establishing reliable contact with several 
(09BAMAKO211, 08BAMAKO239, 07BAMAKO1006). They provided detailed reports 
on the various ‘Arab’ groups in Mali, identifying three different Arabic and Hassaniya-
speaking Arab groups, the Berabiche, Kounta and Telemsi, whom they estimated were 
more likely candidates for radicalisation than the Tuareg, warning against ‘typecasting 
Tuaregs as terrorists’ (08BAMAKO371). 
 
Crime, particularly contraband and trafficking, had long been of concern as enablers of 
AQIM activities. Diplomats investigated the link between Tuareg activities in the north 
and AQIM in meticulous detail, since these uncontrolled activities were considered key 
to the establishment of AQIM in the Sahel (Gutelius, 2007). Their conclusion was 
unequivocal:  
[W]hile certain Tuareg are clearly providing logistical services to AQIM, 
there is little evidence that this support is motivated by anything beyond 
economic gain. There is no indication, for instance, that Tuareg smugglers or 
bandits have any religious or ideological links with AQIM. What they share 
is an interest in trafficking weapons, drugs and anything else passing through 
the Sahara. Malian Tuaregs generally regard AQIM as a foreign extremist 
group trespassing on Tuareg land. The Algerians who form the backbone of 
AQIM do not speak the Tuareg language of Tamachek and share no cultural 
ties with Malian Tuaregs. (08BAMAKO371) 
 
Diplomats further documented this position through interviews with Tuareg leaders. 
They garnered from these exchanges that trans-Saharan trade has been a key source of 
Tuareg monetary income for centuries, not the result of sudden enthusiasm for crime 
and terrorism. Another key source of income that linked Tuaregs to territorial control 
was the fee paid to cross (and be guided through) certain areas, a practice the cables 
recognise as widespread and practiced by all Saharan groups including AQIM 
(08BAMAKO371). Cables observe many Tuareg wanted to expel AQIM from their 
desert routes, leading to a conflict that ‘remains one for commercial dominance’ of trade 
routes, particularly for cigarettes, petrol, arms, clothing and food (07BAMAKO1006). 
This assessment was an opportunity for distinct contextualised identification, given the 
evidence that AQIM had its own slate of commercial activities, including trade, 
trafficking and contraband to their lucrative and visible kidnapping activity (Larémont, 
2011). The conflict of enterprises led to skirmishes between Tuareg and AQIM for the 
entire period covered by the cables, some witnessed by contacts interviewed at the US 
embassy (06BAMAKO1243, 07BAMAKO587, 07BAMAKO1006, 09BAMAKO257). 
 
State Department officials in Mali examined in detail religious extremism and the 
structures and people facilitating it. The most extensive assessments concentrated on 
Saudi-inspired Wahhabism as well as organisations in the longstanding Sufi tradition of 
the Sahel. Unsurprisingly, Western observers were ‘increasingly concerned over a 
segment of Malian Muslims frequently described as “Wahabbi”, fearing that those so 
labeled (sic) are likely to advance a radical agenda’ (07BAMAKO1223). Diplomats 
worked to explore and inform these concerns, meeting prominent religious leaders of 
various denominations despite these worries. In a 2007 cable, embassy officials draw on 
their contacts, meetings and expertise to advance the opinion that ‘Wahabbists’ or ‘al-
Sunna’ in Mali are not comparable to similarly named extremists in Saudia Arabia and 
elsewhere. They were less extreme in their views and integrated in Malian society, ‘[n]or 
are they inherently anti-American or extremist. Apart from the doctrinal differences that 
separate them from Malian Sufis, the al-Sunna’s opinions on issues like Islamic law, the 
treatment of women and religious tolerance are extremely close, and in many cases 
undistinguishable, from their Sufi counterparts’ (07BAMAKO1223). Making this 
distinction, the cable points to a possible approach where ‘[u]nderstanding why this is so, 
and what differentiates the al-Sunna from Mali’s Sufi majority, will improve our ability to 
reach out to Malian Muslims’ (07BAMAKO1223). 
 
Diplomats investigated Sufi traditions, doctrine and groups to assess the threat of 
extremism. They met with Sheick Sherif Ousmane Haidara, leader of the Ansar Dine 
movement founded in the 1980s,1 ‘the only Islamic leader in Mali capable of filling to 
overflow capacity Bamako’s 24,000 seat football stadium’ (08BAMAKO574). Haidara, 
far from being an extremist threat, was an ‘important voice for tolerance’, and a key local 
ally for anti-extremism efforts due to his aversion to extremism, religious violence, cross-
sect appeal and willingness to work with international partners. The author of the cable 
saw an opportunity to ‘explore ways of working with Haidara to help reinforce Malians’ 
traditional aversion to extremist messages’ (08BAMAKO574). Embassy officials also 
travelled to Nioro du Sahel, on the border with Mauritania, to meet with Amadou Hady 
Tall and Moamed Ould Cheikhna, respectively leaders of the Tijani and Hamalli Sufi 
traditions. They made it clear to embassy officials that they opposed AQIM, its goals and 
methods and were ‘concerned about the number of individuals encouraging violence in 
the name of Islam’ (08BAMAKO288). So far, US diplomats had not encountered 
evidence of large-scale religious extremism on the order of the perceived Al Qaeda threat 
in Mali.  
 
Finding no direct link between Tuareg militancy and religious affiliation, diplomats 
turned to exhaustive documentation of Tuareg grievances including human rights abuses, 
mistrust of the Bamako government in the north, poor governance and lack of 
infrastructure. Communications documented the political consequences of human rights 
abuses of Tuareg and Arabs in northern Mali, even identifying serial abusers such as the 
Malian-sponsored militias led by Colonel-Major Abderahmane Ould Meydou who 
frequently killed and tortured Tuareg prisoners (09BAMAKO211, 08BAMAKO366, 
08BAMAKO239). These abuses, the cables highlight, are of extreme political 
importance: Tuareg relations with the Bamako government are undermined, fuel 
grievances, create lasting mistrust and resentment against the government 
(08BAMAKO239). Similarly, poor representation in government is an issue of 
contention, particularly the lack of northerners in the Presidency and key institutions 
(09BAMAKO105, 08BAMAKO239). Lack of investment in public infrastructure such as 
wells, corruption of the few government officials in the north, and lack of faith in Malian 
justice and security are long-term problems fuelling Tuareg and Arab grievances 
(09BAMAKO211, 08BAMAKO239). 
 
US diplomats were concerned about the Tuareg-Malian Algiers accords of June 2006. 
Supported by the US and mediated by Algeria, the accords provided for improved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  also spelled Ançar Dine. This is not the same Ansar Dine that took over northern Mali with MNLA in 
2012 led by Iyad Ag Ghaly. Both mean ‘defenders of the faith’	  
northern governance, some degree of autonomy and most importantly for mixed Tuareg, 
Arab and Southern military units to provide security in the three northern provinces. The 
Malian government proved reticent and cables made it clear that at least ‘the partial 
success of the Algiers Accords’ was essential to avoid another rebellion 
(08BAMAKO239). If grievances including compliance with the Algiers Accords are not 
resolved, cables warn, disparate Tuareg, Arab and Songhrai movements will once again 
join forces against Bamako as had happened in the 1990s (08BAMAKO239). ‘Alarm 
bells should start to ring the moment violence spreads to include a non-Tuareg group of 
rebels or bandits’ (08BAMAKO824). 
 
Considering this expertise, diplomats were in a position to advise on the role of the US in 
the context of achieving antiterrorism goals in Mali. Firstly, it is clear diplomats were 
sceptical of a military solution to the northern problem. Cables show no confidence, 
‘given the Malian military’s most recent performance’ in their capacity to secure ‘Mali’s 
north-eastern corner’ (08BAMAKO295). Secondly, they made it clear that any solution 
should not be primarily military, but advised that it was a priority for the 2006 Algiers 
Accords to come into effect (08BAMAKO239). In a ‘scene-setter’ for a June 2008 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Todd Moss visit to Mali, Ambassador Terence 
McCulley advises that the visit ‘will afford an important opportunity for us to engage 
Malian government officials on need for forward movement on the Algiers Accords’ 
(08BAMAKO491). The formation of mixed Tuareg-Malian-Arab military units was a 
particularly thorny unresolved provision of the Algiers accord. Diplomats advised that 
‘[p]ressure and resources from other international partners –such as the US, Canada and 
the EU- may give President Toure the ability to make some face-saving concessions such 
as a reduction of force in Tinzawaten [in Kidal province] and the creation of mixed 
military units’ (08BAMAKO375). In addition to compliance with the Accords, they 
advised that the Malian government be pressured to address human rights abuses and 
insecurity, particularly public executions of Tuareg and torture of prisoners by Malian 
militias to reduce mistrust of the Malian government (08BAMAKO419, 
08BAMAKO375). 
 
Diplomats had also detected goodwill towards the US by Tuareg leaders. Throughout the 
period studied, cables note Tuareg efforts to help the rescue of Westerners kidnapped by 
AQIM (09BAMAKO186), challenge AQIM militarily (09BAMAKO257, 
07BAMAKO1006, 07BAMAKO587, 06BAMAKO1243), and multiple offers of 
counterterrorism assistance (08BAMAKO462). Some of this goodwill stemmed from 
political and logistical assistance for the 2007 Kidal Forum, which had cemented the new 
Algiers Accords signed the previous year and showed American ‘commitment to find a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict in northern Mali’ (07BAMAKO394). 
 
Observations made in cables as to representation of the Tuareg in Malian government 
communications with the US indicate scepticism and suspicion that Malian focus on the 
Tuareg as enablers of terror is a ‘Tuareg diversion’ (08BAMAKO462). This suspicion is 
reinforced by claims by Tuareg contacts that ‘Mali receives “tens of thousands” of dollars 
in counter-terrorism assistance from the U.S. and other donors but is now using this 
money to fight Tuaregs instead of terrorists’ which they attributed to ‘using AQIM as an 
excuse for harassing local Tuareg populations’ (08BAMAKO462, 09BAMAKO211). 
This link was not credible to US diplomats; AQIM was using northern Mali as a base, 
but ‘no terrorist attacks occurred in Mali’ in 2008 (08BAMAKO937). In sum, 
‘typecasting Tuaregs as terrorists’ was a mistake – other groups were more likely 
customers for terrorism (08BAMAKO371). 
 
Diplomats’ analysis also identified the potentially negative political productivity of 
‘perceptions’ of counterterrorism. ‘Should tensions and clashes between the Malian 
military and Tuareg rebels increase, Tuaregs in opposition to the Malian government are 
likely to perceive counter-terrorism assistance provided by the U.S. and other 
international donors to the Malian military as counter to Tuareg interests’ 
(08BAMAKO462). In other words, the Tuareg could come to see counterterrorism as a 
threat to themselves, their grievances and claims for autonomy. The cables highlight ‘the 
delicate balance the USG [US Government] must strike between supporting Malian 
sovereignty over their territory and providing economic alternatives to a population 
which historically controlled the Trans-Saharan trade routes’ (08BAMAKO462). 
Throughout the period studied, cables recommend that constant US pressure on Mali to 
‘hammer out a realistic timeline for Algiers Accords implementation’ was essential to 
avoid a Tuareg crisis as well as northern suspicion of the US and counterterrorism 
(08BAMAKO339). Additionally, the cables advise that the US could, and should, 
pressure the Malian government to engage meaningfully with Tuareg grievances, address 
human rights abuses, lack of economic opportunity, food security, education, and some 
political autonomy (08BAMAKO366, 08BAMAKO375). 
 
 
Policy concerns: the Malian State, counterterrorism, territory, subjects 
 
US policy during 2003-2012 did not reflect the advice of its diplomats. The overriding 
priority in Western Sahel policy was counterterrorism, which was to be achieved by 
denying terrorists space and resources. This policy translated into concrete actions to 
shore up the Malian state’s hold over the north (Joffe, 2012). Most resulting policy 
decisions gravitated around the view that Malian control of the north would result in the 
ability to counter the (then small) AQIM presence. US initiatives to address grievances in 
the north were limited in scope and scale whilst Malian efforts had been minimal since 
independence. In addition some policies were contradictory, like the IMF and State 
Department-supported privatisation of the cotton industry, which cables suggested 
would lead to further unemployment and the degradation of traditional growing and 
elaboration networks (09BAMAKO340). Policy objectives to address Tuareg and Arab 
social and human rights as well as economic grievances were, despite the advice of 
diplomats, secondary to military counterterrorism approaches, particularly military aid 
and training. This section firstly analyses the articulation of Saharan identities in 
diplomatic communication, retrieving how they are constructed and the terms of its 
economy of identity. Secondly US policy priorities in northern Mali are analysed, 
focusing on control of the northern territories, the “Tuareg first, then AQIM” approach, 
and control of facilitators.  
 
Controlling the ‘porous borders’, ‘a frontier that totals more than 7,000km’, and vast 
‘ungoverned spaces’ of northern Mali became the chief means to counter terrorism in the 
Sahel (08BAMAKO217, 09BAMAKO4350, 07BAMAKO1361, see also Anderson, 
2013). This was established as early as 2002 and had by then already failed to contextually 
identify AQIM (earlier known as Groupe Salafiste de Predication et du Combat, GSPC) 
and its role among regional actors (see Joffe, 2012). The cables demonstrate that military 
control of the north was an overarching priority. The vast majority of the cables from the 
Bamako embassy - and every single one with “Tuareg” in the title - include 
considerations of terrorism and security. The problems and subjects of terrorism in the 
frontier territory of northern Mali are represented in the most superlative terms possible 
in geographical expression. Constantly repeated terms are: ‘vast’, ‘sparsely populated and 
vast northern regions’, providing ‘a haven for smugglers, bandits and terrorist elements’ 
(08BAMAKO491, 09BAMAKO4350). These terms are the currency of this theme, 
repeated in every communication and serving as the basis for considerations of spatial 
issues. They are the terms that both describe and, most importantly, constitute the spatial 
dimension where northern Mali is located. Control, defence and security of northern 
Mali are described in vocabulary reminiscent of siege warfare: a ‘porous’ border of ‘more 
than 7,000km’ which the ‘Malian government is unable to fully secure […] due to their 
size and remote nature’ (08BAMAKO491). 
 
The actors that inhabit and move in this space live in an anarchic ‘ungoverned’ world of 
‘unrest’ where the capacity for violence and fraught emptiness are posited as inextricable 
(08BAMAKO491). Such descriptions of subjects and spaces could be taken out of a 
book for 1930s teenagers like Tintin (Hergé, 2011). Historically a haven for ‘smugglers’, 
‘bandits’, the vast desert could serve as well for terrorists (08BAMAKO491). The 
language in which operations by Tuareg rebel Ibrahim Bahanga are described reflects the 
assumption of uncontrolled subjects in uncontrolled spaces. Textualisations like 
‘Bahanga runs amok’, ‘ventured into … region’, ‘roaming’ across deserts, suggest that this 
space of emptiness gives license license, so that violence and tribal allegiances are the 
only limitations (08BAMAKO968). As examined above, diplomats made efforts to 
highlight that the link between these activities and terrorism is questionable and 
occasional at most. Subjects are situated in Western spatial and temporal discourses in 
very specific terms. The space they inhabit, the desert, is empty, removed from all 
civilisations and thus incomprehensible, deeply romanticised and intertwined with 
historicised visions of Arabian conquest on camelback (see Said, 1990, 2003; Vatin, 
1984). Temporally, the context is one of previous camelback caravans replaced by 
traffickers, bandits and outlaws on 4x4s in a frame that expounds a negative process of 
modernisation (08BAMAKO435). The resulting normative or ethical location of subjects 
inhabiting the Sahara is one of lawlessness, crime and survival, making it ever more 
possible for these dodgy characters to collaborate with AQIM for ‘economic gain’ 
(08BAMAKO371). 
 
The policy response was to enhance Mali’s capacity for counterterrorism by helping it 
control its territory and people, since it wasn’t able to alone (08BAMAKO491). The 
strategy denoted by the diplomatic communication is that such control would enable 
Mali to effectively counter terrorism (see for instance 09BAMAKO85). This territorial 
control approach to counterterrorism meant that the first priority was to quell the Tuareg 
rebellion and the resulting security in the north would then allow the Malian military to 
concentrate on AQIM. This approach is especially marked from the very end of the 
incipient and small 2006 Tuareg rebellion until the end of the period studied in 2010. 
The “Tuareg first, then AQIM” approach explains efforts by diplomats to exhaustively 
document and advise on solutions to Tuareg restiveness: Mali’s control of its Tuaregs 
was effectively established as a precondition to counterterrorism efforts.  
 
This approach was part of a wider drive to develop a Saharan regional approach to 
counter terrorism. This was based on a partnership of willing Saharan States, firstly the 
Pan-Sahel Initiative (2002-2004) and then the Trans-Saharan counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCT). Their goal, particularly the TSCT, was to control territory, denying 
terrorist groups safe haven (Anderson, 2013). This partnership was founded on the need 
for each state to effectively police its own borders and provide sufficient security and 
social stability to avoid the rise of further extremism (Larémont, 2011, p. 262). The 
policy of territory denial required strong and stable state organisations and it was 
estimated that the greatest challenge was to ensure each of them could fully control their 
territory (Boudali, 2007). Any subjects identified as an obstacle to this control therefore 
emerge as the priority threats to the implementation of counterterrorism policy.  
 
Mali had demonstrated willingness to participate to the extent that it was considered ‘an 
important ally in the global war on terror and a key member of the Trans-Sahara 
Counter-Terrorism Partnership’ (08BAMAKO491). Just as often, Malian officers added 
the proviso that the north needed to be under full control before Mali could turn its 
efforts to AQIM (08BAMAKO558). In sum, ‘an end to hostilities with the Malian 
government may enable northern units commanded by Bamako to turn their sights on 
other pressing northern security matters including AQIM’ (09BAMAKO85). 
Counterterrorism in Mali was overtaken by territoriality and the Tuareg issue: Bamako is 
willing to assist in counterterrorism but only when it has resolved issues in the north. As 
analysed in the first section, diplomats constantly argued in cables that this was 
achievable by implementation of the Algiers Accords and a concerted Malian effort to 
address Tuareg human rights and economic grievances. Between 2002 and 2008, US 
efforts addressed these multifaceted recommendations with programs ranging from the 
Ambassador’s Girls Education Program to assistance for the development of Malian 
governance, social services and economic development in the north (Larémont, 2011, p. 
261).  
 
The last major diplomatic effort to encourage a political solution in the north was a 
meeting between Malian Foreign Minister Ouane and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Todd Moss, where the latter expresses support and offers assistance for the 
implementation of the Algiers Accords (08BAMAKO558). Policy application as 
developed by 2008, however, limited focus on military assistance, training, material and 
intelligence to secure the north. The cables bear this out: the “Tuareg first, then AQIM” 
approach is assumed to be the key medium-term strategy in all cables examined; 
additionally policy increasingly focused from 2008 on territorial control, denial of havens, 
rather than northern grievances. The question emerges as to how the social aspect of US 
counterterrorism policy for Mali was progressively diluted 2006-8.  
 
The short analysis of the constitution of Saharan identities in diplomatic communication 
suggests that subjects identified as an obstacle to Sahel counterterrorism’s central tenet 
of territorial control (‘Traffickers’, Tuaregs, ‘bandits’) could potentially emerge as 
terrorist-enabling subjects, a threat to implementation of counterterrorism policy. It is 
also clear that, for US diplomats at least, this was not the case with the Tuareg. 
 
The development of US counterterrorism policy in the Sahel poses the pressing question 
of how, despite diplomats’ detailed and nuanced recommendations, the shift in focus 
from social to military capabilities came about. To thus enquire into this shift in policy 
implementation additionally invites the question of Mali’s agency in the implementation 
of US counterterrorism policy in the Sahara.  
 
 
‘You can count on us’: American policy concerns and Malian policy agency 
 
The consequences of the shift in focus of Saharan counterterrorism policy were 
devastating for US diplomatic reporting and for subsequent policymaking. Reporting 
priorities focus on control of space, subjects, willingness and readiness of partner 
Saharan states to participate in the War on Terror as well as factors working against 
counterterrorism collaboration. This section firstly analyses shifts in State Department 
reporting priorities and how this elicited changes in focus and content. This analysis 
greatly benefits from the April 2009 cable 09STATE37566 signed Hillary Clinton 
‘Reporting and collection needs: West Africa Sahel Region’, which over seven pages 
details information and intelligence collection priorities for US diplomats in West Africa. 
This analysis delves into State Department responses to its diplomatic officers to assess 
the usefulness of this reporting and particularly how it was read back in Washington. The 
analysis then moves onto how the shift in priorities changed the nature of diplomatic 
reporting, ultimately enabling the Touré government to gain significant agency in 
directing US efforts in the application of counterterrorism policy in Mali whilst similar 
efforts by the Tuareg failed.  
 
Reporting priorities in diplomatic communication by 2008-9 feature collections of 
biographic information on individuals of security relevance since ‘the intelligence 
community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information 
collected worldwide’ (09STATE37566). Biographic information collection included 
contact, personal, financial, social and even social media details, which were then passed 
on to security agencies (09STATE37566). This reporting goes hand in hand with the 
identification of groups to which specific subjects belong, their relative influence within 
it and aspects of their background and affiliations that might be of security relevance. 
For instance, the above-cited cable 08BAMAKO371, a report on northern ethnic and 
tribal groups, details individuals of relevance for each group.  
 
‘Response To Terrorism’, particularly ‘[c]apability, willingness and intent of countries to 
cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts and policies, and to conduct 
counterterrorist operations’ was another key issue on which diplomats are requested to 
report in detail (09STATE37566). This was to be referenced against the bibliographic 
data (determining who was helpful in counterterror) to ensure a more complete and 
intelligence-worthy assessment. Mali is constantly identified as one such helpful actor, 
passionately willing to collaborate in counterterrorism.  
 
State Department additionally requested details of insurgents, opposition movements, 
nationalists and any other group that might destabilise a partner government 
(09STATE37566). Focus on this concern for ‘instability’ of state control of space, 
subjects and movement is related to the assessment of a state’s capability to engage in 
counterterrorism and is part of a list of factors diplomats are requested to investigate in 
the context of issues that might hinder counterterrorism or assist terror – which are 
placed at the same discursive level (09STATE37566). This list notably includes questions 
as to how non-state subjects participate in/against the War on Terror including: human 
traffickers, drug dealers, smugglers, refugee groups, legal and illegal opposition groups 
and human rights organisations.  
 
When information is requested for such groups in West Africa (Mali appears a priority 
country in this reporting request, 09STATE37566) two aspects of this list are remarkable. 
Firstly, all of these factors are placed at the same level as impediments to effective 
counterterrorist collaboration. They are treated similarly on the basis of the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) established on 24 February 2003 which also 
dictated the means by which intelligence was to be collected, allocating significant 
human-contact-based intelligence gathering to diplomats. The second remarkable feature 
is the requirement to assess, for all non-state actors, even opposition parties, the extent 
to which they are related, financed or linked to ‘foreign governments or 
insurgent/separatist groups’ as well as ‘collaboration with terrorist or insurgent groups’. 
This creates a binary: non-state actors against partner states. If the latter are the willing 
actors in counterterrorism initiatives, the former can become obstacles and threats.  
 
The Director of National Intelligence’s 2003 NIPF, mandated on diplomatic reporting in 
2004 in cable 04STATE179667, and updated in 2009 in cable 09STATE37566, colonised 
diplomatic reporting practices by establishing key requirements and frameworks of 
assessment and relevance. Crucially for identification of the Tuareg’s role in 
counterterrorism, it established the assumption in diplomatic reporting that all non-state 
subjects are potentially linked to terrorist or insurgent activity. The result was predictable. 
Information, now channelled and assessed along the terms of NIPF, responded to 
intelligence-gathering, strategic, security and military priorities. Observation of the cables 
produced after the application of the NIPF show this in a number of ways. At a basic 
level almost all reporting, even on presidential and parliamentary election results, includes 
consequences for counterterrorism strategy. Deeper in the cables, particularly the 
exchange between the State Department and the mission, show that a filtering process 
occurs, where much of the above-analysed detail and nuance is lost and disappears, 
particularly from 2008. It became simply irrelevant in the light of the codification and 
prioritisation of information dictated by the dominant policy concern of counterterror. A 
2008 cable with questions from the State Department for US diplomats in Bamako 
illustrates this filtering process (08STATE90615). The questions it poses are concerned 
with the ‘Tuareg insurgents in Mali’ challenge to Malian stability although one of the 
questions still addresses Malian abuses in Kidal from the perspective of its capacity to 
cause unrest or even ‘a full-scale rebellion’ (08BAMAKO824). 
 
The assessment of the relevance of information and resulting filtering is visible in cable 
09STATE99793 authored six months after the aforementioned 2009 update to NIPF 
priorities in diplomatic reporting. The State Department ‘GREATLY APPRECIATE 
POST’S CONTINUING REPORTING ON POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE 
MALI-AQIM RELATIONSHIP. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN VERY 
INTERESTED IN THESE REPORTS, AS HAVE SENIOR POLICYMAKERS 
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FBI AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.’ (Capitals in original) The reporting in cables had 
increasingly become restricted in detail and nuance, its relevance strictly assessed and 
governed by policy priorities. The cables go on to inform additional policy-making, 
further entrenching this rise in contextual information scarcity. Most importantly, these 
set the scene for any non-state actor in northern Mali to be potentially identified as an 
enabler of terrorism, for policy to increasingly focus on border and territorial control to 
the detriment of social and political factors.  
 
The gradual narrowing in range, scope and relevance of diplomatic reporting allowed for 
the initial social and political US policy answer to northern Mali instability to sink. Cables 
reveal that this situation was extremely productive for Touré’s government, which filled 
the gap in information and relevance and in so doing secured significant agency in the 
application of counterterror policy in the Sahel.  
 
The Malian government enthusiastically communicated its willingness and readiness to 
counter terrorism. The first plank of this support of counterterrorism was state-level 
commitment to US-led counterterrorism initiatives the Pan-Sahel Initiative (2002-2004) 
and then TSCT, to which the Malian government constantly reiterated support. (See 
08BAMAKO491 for instance). This support is reiterated at any available opportunity, for 
instance in meetings with US ambassadors, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and 
US General Ward, Head of AFRICOM (08BAMAKO558, 07BAMAKO1361, 
08BAMAKO219). Mali was also involved in a number of US-funded development 
initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Compact, as mentioned by former President 
G. W. Bush and President Touré’s at a meeting in Washington in 2008. (“President Bush 
Meets with Mali President Amadou Touré,” 2008) In 2007 the Malian government even 
advocated installing the headquarters of AFRICOM in Bamako on the basis of Mali’s 
‘strong bilateral relationship with the United States (07BAMAKO166). It is of interest to 
note that whilst Malian expressions of counterterrorist willingness were enthusiastic, the 
cables make it clear that diplomats were extremely sceptical of its application, which they 
described as inconsistent, poorly planned and minimal, to the point that they made it 
clear that they had no faith in the ability of the Malian military to achieve any security or 
counterterrorist objectives (08BAMAKO295). 
 
In this context of willing collaboration, Mali was able to propose the mission of 
counterterrorism in its own terms, language and most importantly, its own identification 
of subjects despite the warnings of US diplomats. This is how Touré’s government 
proposed its enemies as subjects of counterterrorism. The link is constantly proposed by 
Malian diplomats between lack of control in the north and AQIM’s presence, 
conditioning Malian efforts against AQIM upon full control of the north (see 
08BAMAKO558, 08BAMAKO357, 09BAMAKO85). 
 
Linking territorial control of the north and counterterrorism is crucial because it 
responds and engages with US preoccupations with free flows of people and material. 
This bind, I argue, furthermore came to constitute the US approach to counterterrorism 
in Mali, particularly the military intensification of that approach, to the detriment of the 
hitherto proposed social and regional focus. This logic was at the heart of shifts in US 
policy towards collaboration and policy in Mali. It produced another diplomatic good for 
Mali: it served as a justification for Mali’s slowness in applying the Algiers Accords and 
more generally address Tuareg grievances. This reveals a cleavage in agency: though US 
diplomats (and even journalists) had identified key grievances in need of resolution, this 
gradually ceded from 2008 to the priority of strategic control of the north – firmly 
encouraged by the Malian government. It is worth noting that the role of paramilitaries 
remains unchallenged and they remain key to the present conflict in northern Mali 
(“Suicide attack against Mali Tuaregs,” 2015). 
 
How did the political cause of counterterrorism become militarised despite the well-
informed initial caution and awareness? This necessitates analysis to identify how the 
language of diplomatic communication locates priorities and identities, for the very 
words used by Malian diplomats gain great relevance at this stage. This is the key instance 
where diplomatic communication by Malian officers could link their approach to policy 
implementation to US identification of subjects and political issues, and can be found 
delving into the history of this specific diplomatic communication. At a 2008 meeting, 
President Touré told the US ambassador McCulley and AFRICOM commander General 
Ward that the priority was ‘to develop the capacity to control Mali’s northern zones’ 
highlighting the ‘roughly 650,000 square km of terrain in northern Mali. Touré said he 
was counting on US support for this venture’ (08BAMAKO217). In terms of how to 
achieve this, he indicated that ‘Mali wants to help the U.S. counter Islamic extremism, 
but that Mali must deal with its security issues on its own’ and proceeded to request 
military training and material assistance (08BAMAKO217). President Touré concluded 
this request with a reminder of Malian counterterrorist commitment to collaboration in 
counterterrorism through TSCT Partnership and other programs (08BAMAKO217). 
 
This approach can be retraced to a 2007 meeting between US Deputy Secretary of State 
Negroponte and Malian President Touré and Foreign Minister Ouane. In the textual 
evidence of this meeting key identifications of subjects and articulations of conflict above 
analysed and which were progressively absorbed into US policy application 
(07BAMAKO1361). The most salient articulation emerging from this meeting, which as 
analysed is repeated in subsequent cables, is the link between Malian lack of control of 
the north and terrorism, particularly following the peace agreement that in the late 1990s 
effectively reduced Malian military presence in the north to a minimum, for ‘Mali’s 
compliance with this agreement created a security vacuum that terrorists, extremists and 
illicit traffickers have now turned to their advantage.’ (07BAMAKO1361). A key 
consequence of this, the narrative posits, is that groups such as Tuareg rebels, 
‘traffickers’ and ‘bandits’ are facilitating the activities of AQIM as well as affording safe 
haven. This is a key subtlety and is worth quoting in full. As the cable reports, Foreign 
Minister Ouane 
 drew a distinction between Malian Tuaregs and AQIM, noting that Mali’s 
Tuareg population had disassociated itself with extremism and terrorist 
ideologies. He characterised Malian nationals, whether ethnic Tuareg or 
otherwise, who provide economic or logistical support to AQIM as bandits 
involved in trafficking everything from arms to drugs and cigarettes. 
Referring to illicit traffickers and AQIM, Ouane said this base must be 
suffocated so that this extremism does not spread. “We do not want,” he 
continued, “terrorists using our territory as a safe haven. Their presence puts 
in question our security and that of the region. (07BAMAKO1361) 
 
This identification of subjects in this text is key: Tuaregs are not terrorists per se, but 
many are facilitators of AQIM. The solution, Touré argued, was increased US military 
assistance in the form of training, material including vehicles, communication equipment 
and air assets. This identification, although to some extent challenged by US diplomats 
on the ground, was to dominate subsequent policymaking, drawing the implementation 
of counterterrorism initiatives towards security rather than social and political solutions. 
This is the moment of diplomatic communication where it is possible to locate the origin 
of the “Tuareg first, then AQIM” approach in US policymaking, and the gradual decline 
of approaches advocating the use of US influence in Mali to constructively find long-
term solutions to northern grievances. This Malian diplomatic intervention in US 
identification of political subjects was, it is important to highlight, facilitated by the 
identification of Mali (enthusiastically supported by Malian officials) as a strong partner. 
‘At the close of the meeting, President Touré told the Deputy Secretary and Amb. 
Danilovitch that he had recently heard a report on Radio France that described Mali as 
the “favorite child” of the U.S. President. Touré said he was extremely happy to hear 
Mali described as such and that he agreed with the description. “You can,” said the 
President, “count on us”.’ (07BAMAKO1361). 
 
It might be added that another potential counterterrorist collaboration was available, but 
never considered because of the above-examined focus on state-centric security and the 
identification of the Tuareg as potential or part-time AQIM facilitators. At numerous 
meetings with embassy staff, Tuareg leaders such as Ibrahim Mohamed Asselah, Ahmada 
ag Bibi and Deity ag Sidamou actively reported on AQIM activities in the north and on 
their own anti-AQIM operations (08BAMAKO888). These instances of assistance, it 
should be noted, are not insignificant and, in the period studied, amount to much more 
anti-AQIM effort than the Malian government had even been able to mount. They 
include: assistance to free Western hostages (08BAMAKO888, 09BAMAKO186), 
several expressions of goodwill to the US (07BAMAKO394, 09BAMAKO186) as well as 
the particularly relevant reports of efforts to fight AQIM in a number of battles 
(06BAMAKO1243, 09BAMAKO257) and their willingness to participate in anti-AQIM 
offensives with the Us and other partners, since they too loathe ‘Salafists’ 
(07BAMAKO1006). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Territorial control and haven denial approaches to counterterrorism are now being 
widely questioned on the basis of their recent ineffectiveness in a number of theatres of 
the War on Terror. (see for instance “The Myth of the Terrorist Safe Haven,” 2015) This 
analysis has asked the how questions through an investigation of US and Malian 
diplomatic dynamics. How did this approach become dominant in Mali counterterrorism 
policy despite the initially wide-ranging social and political objectives of US policy in the 
Sahel? Analysis of US diplomatic communication 2006-2010 has explored the reporting 
and terms of policy advice provided by diplomats at the Bamako mission, how policy 
concerns were articulated and came to influence subsequent diplomatic reporting and, 
finally, how this affected the identification of political subjects such as the Tuareg and 
affected policymaking.  
 
This analysis has found that, firstly, prioritisation of diplomatic communication in 
response to dominant policy concerns resulted in a filtering of diplomatic information 
and advice. Some information became irrelevant, whilst the information that remained in 
diplomatic communication was relevant in terms of the dominating territorial control 
approach to counterterrorism. In other words, the terms in which policy priorities were 
articulated governed the filtering of information, furthering focus on territorial control 
issues and purportedly terrorism-enabling actors like the Tuareg, leaving behind the 
relevance of social and political issues in northern Mali. Secondly, this conditioning of 
the terms of diplomatic communication enabled Touré’s government to propose and 
obtain the enshrining of its “Tuareg first, then AQIM” approach and meant that, 
contrary to the advice of diplomats that the US could and should pressure Mali for 
fulfilment of the Algiers Accords (see 08BAMAKO462 for instance), no such pressure 
was exercised.  
 
The failure to pressure for implementation of the political and social solutions of the 
Algiers Accords and the subsequent focus on a border and territorial security solution 
directly enabled the disaster of 2012. Mali’s government had been enabled and supported 
in not dealing with northern grievances, as Gutelius (2007) predicted. This was made 
possible by Malian diplomacy’s capacity to draw on US policy concerns to further its 
own approach to counterinsurgency in northern Mali and continually delay 
implementation of the Algiers Accords. This policy position was additionally a 
contributing factor in the 2012 Malian Army coup whose military leaders advocated 
further force to control the north.   
 
Analysis of diplomatic communication demonstrates that the source of the ultimate 
failure of identification of subjects and key issues in US counterterrorism policymaking in 
Mali was the relentless prioritisation of antiterrorism policy articulated in terms of 
territorial control. It led to priority objectives being articulated as military and security 
targets which were assessed in terms of military progress, rather than the political, social 
and development objectives advocated by diplomats. The role and function of this 
articulation of policy priorities is what critical political theorists label an episteme. As 
Foucault argued, an episteme is an apparatus that governs the admissibility of knowledge, 
defining ‘the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or 
silently invested in a practice’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 168). In the case of counterterrorism in 
Mali, the discourse of counterterrorism, dominated by territorial, border and population 
control security approaches acts an episteme: it discards the information and advice of 
diplomats, and offers answers from its own internal logic. In other words, the 
prioritisation of territorial security approaches in the implementation of counterterrorism 
policy led to a requirement for these factors to be highlighted in diplomatic 
communication, to the detriment of social and political issues. This prioritisation further 
reinforced the territorial approach to counterterrorism in Mali. In diplomatic 
communication the analysis has observed that this process of prioritisation led to other 
information identifying northern Malian political subjects falling out of relevance. I 
should highlight that this is not the result of a strategic decision to ignore reporting 
Tuareg political grievances in favour of shoring up the Malian state. Rather, such 
information simply became irrelevant.  
 
The diplomatic reporting dynamic that dropped contextual details and nuance in favour 
of reporting in the terms and articulations of territorial control approaches to 
counterterrorism provided an opportunity for the Malian regime. Malian diplomats 
articulated their own approach to northern issues deploying vocabulary and strategic 
currency that was already of the highest priority in US policymaking. This unlocked 
considerable agency for the Malian government to influence the detail of the application 
of counterterrorism policy in Mali. It was possible because Malian diplomatic 
interventions purportedly responded to the very words, articulations of the dominant 
policy concern with control of territory and subjects which, acting as episteme, 
categorised these interventions as valid and commensurate. The identities deployed in 
these interventions were key to this success: the Tuareg as opportunistic AQIM 
facilitators, the desert as a vast ungoverned Hobbesian anarchic space to be tamed by 
force to deny ‘safe haven’ to AQIM.  
 
Tuareg, Berbiche and other northern minorities became the political subjects to be 
brought under control. They inhabited spaces that were removed from modern 
development and the spatial safety provided by state control of territory and borders. 
Furthermore, these subjects became identified with the enablers of terrorism – 
traffickers, criminals, insurgents that destabilise partner states - that intelligence gathering 
priority directives ordered diplomats to find. This was a fruitful manoeuvre for Touré’s 
government: it resulted, against the advice offered by US diplomats in Bamako, in US 
acceptance of the “Tuareg first, then AQIM” approach, minimal US pressure to 
implement the Algiers Accords and concentration of US assistance on military and 
strategic objectives, rather than resolution of northern social, economic and ethnic 
grievances.  
 
As Senator Coons argued, there was and there is much more to Mali, the Western Sahel 
and the Sahara than terror and extremism. Policy ought to address ‘all three of these 
difficult, complex and interconnected crises – security, political and humanitarian - at the 
same time. (“Senate African Affairs Subcommittee hearing on Mali,” 2012) The 
knowledge to do this was available, but was made irrelevant by concentration on security 
approaches to terrorism. We should have listened to the guys on the ground.  
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